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Abstract 
Past studies, largely based on the US, have argued that differential coverage of men and women 
candidates could explain the lack of women in elected political office. We investigate, first, whether a 
gender bias exists in coverage of candidates and, second, the possible mechanisms underlying any 
differences in the amount and tone of candidates’ news media coverage. Using data from the 2009 
European Election Study Media Analysis, drawn from media coverage in 25 EU member states, we 
find that, similar to previous research, there is evidence of a gender gap in the amount of media 
coverage. Even for highly prominent and competitive candidates, the gender bias in media coverage 
remains. However, this bias in media coverage largely reflects the parties' pre-selection of viable 
candidates and that where there are remedies in place to address the underrepresentation of women 
(i.e. quotas) women candidates actually have lower visibility in campaign coverage. We also find that, 
though women candidates are more often the subject of valence evaluations in news stories, male 
candidates are more negatively evaluated in news stories.  
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Introduction 
Candidates with higher levels of media coverage are more easily recognized by voters at the ballot box 
and are therefore likely to have a higher chance of getting elected (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1987). In 
a context of increasing personalization (Karvonen 2010), media centered campaigns (Norris 2000), and 
declining partisan attachments (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), the media can play a crucial role in 
campaigns and news coverage of a candidate could make a difference to electoral success when voters 
are making up their minds later in the campaign (see Dalton 2012 on the German electorate, for 
example). Candidates must rely on the news media to get their message out to voters and biases in the 
amount or type of news coverage can influence the perceptions of voters and the viability of 
candidacies. If women are covered differently than male candidates in the media, and research 
demonstrates this is the case (for example, Kittilson and Kahn 2008), this is a potentially barrier to 
their electoral success and could explain the underrepresentation of women. 
However, little attention has been paid to the logic behind these claims of stereotyped coverage. 
The underlying causes of the gender gap in coverage can either be due to bias in the media (a media 
logic) or due to the selection and placement of candidates by political parties (a party logic). 
Furthermore, the lack of comparative research (with the notable exception of Kittilson and Kahn, 
2008) has meant that it is has been difficult to investigate how electoral systems and candidate 
selection contribute to the coverage of female candidates. These question are even more relevant as 
some scholars have failed to find a gender bias in candidate coverage (see for example, Heldman et al. 
2009; Smith 1997; Uscinski and Goren 2011, Hayes and Lawless 2013) while others do find gendered 
patterns in media coverage (for example, Heldman et al. 2005 and Gidengil and Everitt 2000). 
The majority of this past research has not concentrated on the possible mechanisms leading to 
biased coverage because studies have been based on data from one country and one election only 
where there is minimal variation in factors such as candidate selection and electoral systems. Also, 
these studies tend to aggregate indicators of coverage by gender of the candidate and therefore it is 
impossible to control for other factors that may influence media coverage, such as electoral viability, 
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and those factors are thus omitted from the analysis. Moreover, much of the previous literature has also 
assumed that media coverage is biased if women and men fail to receive equal amounts (and similar 
type) of coverage, whereas one could argue that to demonstrate gender bias in candidate coverage we 
need to compare female and male candidate who are alike in other characteristics that determine the 
amount and type of media coverage.  
Therefore, the central aim of this of this paper is not only to examine potential differences in 
the news media coverage male and female candidates receive, but to investigate what affects 
candidates’ news media coverage and how the effects of traditional predictors, such as incumbency, 
candidate’s party-determined electoral viability (list position), and party’s electoral standing, vary 
depending on candidate’s gender. Using 2009 European Election Study’s Media Content Data, which 
includes candidate level data on media coverage from 25 European Union member states, we 
investigate how varying institutional settings affect individual differences in the amount of news media 
coverage in such a large number of countries. Despite the second order nature of these elections, we 
argue that these are appropriate for examining media coverage. Importantly, our data allow us to 
develop a candidate based, rather than party or country based approach that enables us to take into 
account candidate characteristics as well as party and country characteristics that would influence the 
amount of media coverage a candidate receives. Our results do suggest that parties play a role in any 
gender differentiation in media coverage as political parties tend to not put forward women candidates 
in viable positions. We show limited evidence that the media are to blame for any lack of coverage. 
The results on tone of coverage are more nuanced in that male candidates, on balance, receive more 
negative coverage but are less likely to be evaluated overall.  
 
Women Candidates’ Coverage in the News: A Media or Party Logic 
The current record of evidence of gender biased candidate coverage is mixed. Several scholars show 
that during the American Senate races (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991), Republican primaries (Heldman 
et al. 2005, Meeks 2012), Canadian general elections (Gidengil and Everitt 2000), British general 
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elections (Ross et al. 2013) and European Elections (Banducci et al. 2007) male candidates receive 
more coverage than their female contenders. It is not only the amount of coverage that varies but the 
type of stories in which women and men candidates appear, and the tone of coverage they receive, 
differs, too (Bystrom et al. 2001; Gidengil & Everitt 2000; Heldman et al. 2009; Heldman et al. 2005; 
Kahn 1994a; Kahn & Goldenberg 1991; Uscinski & Goren 2011).  
However, other scholars find that female candidates do not receive differential news media 
coverage (see, for example, Bystrom et al. 2001; Kittilson and Fridkin, 2008; Smith 1997) and 
Heldman et al. (2009) report that Sarah Palin received more coverage than any other vice presidential 
candidate in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. While these scholars fail to find gender gap in the 
amounts of candidate coverage, all of these studies show how stories featuring women are different 
from stories featuring male candidates (Bystrom et al. 2001; Heldman et al. 2009; Kittilson and 
Fridkin 2008). The most recent and comprehensive account of US congressional elections, however, 
questions the use of gender stereotypes in coverage of female candidates and finds that bias both in 
terms of the amount of coverage and stereotypes does not exist in contemporary congressional 
elections (Hayes and Lawless 2013).  
While the most recent literature has moved on to study gendered mediation and the differences 
in the type and tone of media coverage of highly visible and prominent candidates, such as Hillary 
Clinton and Sarah Palin in the 2008 U.S. presidential race (see for example, Heldman et al. 2009; 
Lawless 2009; Uscinski and Goren 2011), we are left with little knowledge of what influences the 
amount of news media coverage male and female candidates receive. In other words, we ask whether 
the difference in coverage is due to difference in the status of the candidates as fewer women are less 
likely to be incumbents and therefore differences in coverage are due to experience of candidates 
rather than any bias on the part of the news media. In trying to uncover the mechanisms that might 
explain any differences between coverage of male and female candidates, we suggest there is both a 
media logic and a party logic.  
A media logic (Altheide and Snow 1979, Altheide and Snow 1991) suggests that news values 
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dominate in the selection and presentation of political news. Rather than focusing on how media 
portray women, examining the logic behind the coverage, one would focus on how news values and 
journalistic practices might lead to gendered coverage. This logic recognizes that the news media (and 
journalists) are not passive conduits of political information but rather editorial decisions are based on 
the values of journalists. These values include a commitment to informing voters but also maintaining 
audience shares (Zaller 1999). News media might therefore focus on political leaders or those 
candidates deemed more likely to win in order to maintain audience interest. We might also suggest 
that the values of journalists and editors may play a role in any gender bias in coverage. However, 
whereas there may be some differences in the sources male and female reporters cite when writing 
about campaign (Freedman and Fico 2005) there is little evidence to suggest that bias in the editorial 
room (e.g. more male editors) influences coverage of female candidates (Craft and Wanta 2004).   
Furthermore, women candidates are no longer a novelty and journalists may not necessarily revert to 
stereotypes in their reporting. Fowler and Lawless (2009) also caution us against interpreting 
significant candidate gender difference as being media driven and suggest that focusing on political 
context may yield a better understanding of the dynamics underlying differences in media coverage. 
We also argue that a party logic which takes as its starting point that the main goal of political 
parties is to win vote shares and office (Downs 1957); therefore parties put forward the candidates who 
are likely to win and this will, in turn, shape which candidates are covered in the media. Where other 
factors are equal, party selectors, may be more likely to put forward male candidates assuming male 
candidates, based on past outcomes, have a greater likelihood of leading to electoral success. Political 
parties select candidates but also have varying degrees of control over their electoral list ranking and 
list position may affect the amount of media coverage. While in majority/plurality systems parties 
determine individual candidate’s viability by deciding which constituency she runs in, in PR list 
systems (with ranked electoral lists) parties determine individual candidate’s viability by her electoral 
list standing. We expect that this party-determined candidate viability has a strong impact on the 
amount of news media coverage candidates receive. Therefore, if for example women were placed on 
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the electoral lists less favorably than men, women’s unfavorable election list rankings would make 
them less viable and more obscure to media attention.  
 
Explaining Visibility of Women in Election News Coverage 
As this paper studies candidate coverage in 25 different countries, it has the advantage of 
simultaneously studying the effect of individual, party, and institutional/contextual level variables. 
Drawing on the distinctions between the media and party logic, we ask whether any noted differences 
in media coverage of male and female candidates is due to party determined viability or if a gender 
bias exists even after we control for these factors and can be explained by cultural factors which are 
reflected in the media coverage of women. In addition to candidate factors, we argue that a range of 
factors influence media coverage at the country and party level, such as the voting system and the 
electoral strength of the party. In the next section, we develop a set of hypothesis drawing on electoral 
and party systems literature. 
 Political parties play a major role as gatekeepers to electoral office and as such represent one of 
the barriers to women’s representation (Caul 2006) as such they could also indirectly influence the 
amount of media coverage candidates receive. Parties are more likely to nominate women where there 
is less electoral risk or where they are least likely to displace male candidates (Duverger 1955, 
Lakeman 1994). Though this is changing, past research has shown that women are more likely to stand 
in unwinnable seats (Ryan et al. 2010) and appear further down party lists (Luhiste 2015). Journalists 
may find it more efficient to cover viable candidates and this suggests that we would expect greater 
coverage of men based on their greater likelihood of being viable candidates. This leads to our first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Viability influences the amount of news media coverage candidates receive. 
 If, once controlling for the effects of party determined viability, any gap in the coverage 
between men and women is not significant we would argue that media coverage is not biased but 
rather reflects strategic considerations of political parties in terms of candidate selection. That political 
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parties are less likely to put women in electorally viable positions may reflect gender bias, ideological 
norms or organizational structures in parties (Caul 1999, 2006). 
Other considerations are the electoral system and ballot structure. Strategic decisions about the 
selection and list placement of women candidates is largely structured by the type of electoral system 
or ballot structure (Matland 1998). While all EU member states use proportional electoral system to 
elect their representatives to the European Parliament, each country is free to choose the specific 
voting system. In proportional electoral systems voters are most commonly either asked to demonstrate 
their support to a specific candidate of a political party (preferential voting) or to a political party as a 
whole (closed and blocked party list voting) when casting their ballots. Preferential voting systems 
vary from pure preferential systems with open list ballot structure (voters single-handedly determine 
the electoral success of individual candidates) to flexible preferential systems with ordered list ballot 
structure (voters are presented with ranked election lists but based on the amount of preference votes 
these party-determined lists will be amended to a larger or smaller extent when translating votes to 
seats). We argue that the weight different voting systems put on candidates versus parties may 
influence where parties place female candidates and this in turn will influence the news media’s 
reaction to individual candidates.  
In terms of how the media responds to individual candidates, whether the campaign coverage is 
more candidate- or party-centred may influence the attention media pay to women candidates in 
multiple ways. Past research suggests that in preference voting systems personal characteristics that 
mark a candidate as being distinct from others in her party can be seen as a potential advantage in 
gaining preference votes (Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 1980; Shugart et al. 2005). If the competition 
for news media coverage takes place not only between candidates from different parties but also 
between same party candidates, such as in preference voting systems, one could argue that women 
could use their sex as the distinguishing personal characteristic for gaining more news media coverage. 
At the same time, in non-preferential voting systems media are likely to use more party-centred 
campaign coverage. In such a case, it is reasonable to assume that if media pay any attention to 
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individual candidates, it covers the most prominent and viable candidates, and thus care less about 
other distinctive candidate characteristics, such as candidate sex. Based on this argument one would 
expect women to receive more news media coverage in preferential voting systems than in non-
preferential voting systems because in the former systems there are likely to be more opportunities to 
use being a woman as a distinguishing feature when gaining media coverage. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Women are likely to have greater media visibility in preferential than closed list voting 
systems. 
 
In some preferential voting systems party list ranking matters too. Therefore, it could be that in 
different types of preferential voting systems (open versus ordered list voting systems) candidate 
gender has a differential effect on candidates’ news media coverage. In open list systems, candidate 
sex and incumbency are likely to be the most distinctive features that allow candidates to tell apart 
from one another as party list rankings have no effect on electoral outcomes. Therefore, in open list 
systems women may receive more news media coverage because in most countries female candidates 
are more of a novelty than male candidates. However, in ordered list systems media can use, besides 
candidate sex and incumbency, other indicators, such as candidates’ party list rankings, when selecting 
who to cover and who not to cover. 
H3: Women are likely to have less coverage in ordered list voting systems. 
 
As argued above, we expect the amount of news media coverage a candidate receives to be 
strongly affected by her party-determined viability. Previous research suggests that in ordered list 
systems women suffer from less viable electoral list placements than women in closed list systems 
(Luhiste 2015). If party-determined viability is the central predictor of candidates’ news media 
coverage and women are less viable in ordered list systems than in closed list systems, it is likely that 
women also receive less news media coverage in ordered list systems than in closed list systems. 
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Hence, we would witness an interaction effect of party-determined viability and voting system on 
women’s individual news media visibility. Therefore, we pose a conditional hypothesis: 
H4: Viability will have a stronger influence on the amount of media coverage for women 
candidates in ordered/preferential list systems.  
 
A final hypothesis tests for gender bias in the tone of coverage. We have focused on the amount 
of coverage that a candidate receives so far; however, there is also the possibility that the content 
varies between male and female candidates. Contrary to existing research on the amount of coverage, 
studies indicate that women candidates are not always disadvantaged. Past research has found that 
women have more positive coverage than men (Smith 1997, Kahn 1994). The evidence regarding a 
female candidate advantage is more mixed when looking at more salient presidential elections 
(Heldman et al. 2005). Generally, given our focus on second order elections, we hypothesize: 
H5: Female candidates will gain more positive coverage in tone than male candidates. 
 
There are also a range of control variables to consider where we do not formulate hypotheses. 
In the European context, where political parties are the central players on the political arena, 
candidate’s personal viability is highly dependent on her party’s electoral standing, too. Since previous 
literature suggests that accessibility to news media coverage depends on both the candidate’s and her 
party’s electoral viability (Ansolabehere et al. 1991; Iyengar 1990; Trimble and Sampert 2004), it is 
reasonable to expect that a great extent of the variance in candidate coverage is explained by whether a 
candidate is a member of one of the front-running parties.  
Besides the type of voting system, also formal party rules are likely to affect the amount of 
news media coverage female candidates receive. Candidate gender quotas are the most direct way to 
influence the gender composition within political parties and their election lists (Caul 2001). However, 
candidate quotas do not always work as efficiently as planned. In fact, in most cases candidate quotas 
do not prescribe the position which women are to take in party lists, meaning that increasing the share 
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of women among candidates does not necessarily increase their share among viable candidates 
(Matland 2006; Krook 2007), and thus their likelihood of receiving more media coverage. This is why 
we distinguish between candidate quotas with placement mandate rule and candidate quotas that do 
not prescribe the position which women are to take in party lists. We expect that both legislative and 
voluntary party quotas would only be effective if they result in higher list positions for female 
candidates. In other cases they (quotas without placement mandate rule) are likely to remain 
ineffective. 
At the same time, impact of ballot structure, party’s candidate selection process (whether 
women are on the top of the list), and use of candidate quotas might also have spurious effects. The 
fact that in some countries the press cover men and women candidates more equally and that political 
parties position both men and women as their top candidates can simply be an expression of overall 
gender equality in the society. Such expectations are also supported by previous research which argues 
that women experience greater political representation in countries where gender ideology is more 
equal (Matland 1998; Norris & Franklin 1997; Paxton & Kunovich 2003; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 
2005). Considering all that, we expect women to gain more news media coverage in more gender equal 
societies. We explore these additional effects in the analysis. 
Finally, past research suggests that current office holders have better chances of gaining access 
to news media compared to their challengers (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991). Media are likely to pay 
more attention to incumbent office holders because they have proven with past record that they are 
relevant candidates and thus can win a given seat. Giebler and Wagner (2010), however, point out that 
the incumbents might not always have the same impact on voters. They suggest that national 
candidates affect voters’ party choice more than European candidates during European Parliament 
elections (Giebler and Wagner 2010). Therefore, the incumbency in the European Parliament might 
not serve as such a strong predictor of media coverage. Moreover, in the case of European Parliament 
elections, the incumbents are geographically “further away” from their voters and from the national 
media covering these elections. We use incumbency in the selection model (see below) to predict 
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whether a candidate is included in our sample of candidates.  
Data, Measurement and Models: European Parliament elections  
For our analysis, we primarily rely on the 2009 European Election Study (EES) Media Content Data 
that covers news media outlets (both newspapers and broadcast) in the 27 EU member states from the 
2009 election. The benefits of these data in evaluating the visibility of women candidates is that they 
have been collected across a large number of countries using the same coding rules in each country to 
assure comparability across countries (for more information see Schuck et al. 2010). In addition to a 
large sample of candidates, the range of countries allows for an examination of contextual effects in 
terms of party and electoral system characteristics. Even though the same parties and even the same 
candidates participate, these are classified as second-order elections (Franklin 2006, Reiff and Schmitt 
1980) which tend to be less salient in the media (de Vreese et al. 2005).  
Because European Parliament elections are second-order elections and generally produce 
higher levels of representation for women than national elections (Darcy et al. 1994; Ford and Dolan 
1999; Kantola 2009; Matland and Studlar 1998), results may not be generalizable to first order 
elections. Our results based on EP elections could prove “too positive” in the sense that we may 
overestimate women’s news media coverage. However, our objective is not to predict the amount of 
news media coverage female candidates receive but rather explain under which circumstances women 
are more visible in the campaign coverage. Hence, in order to enhance the generalizability of our 
findings it is important that the substantive relationships between our variables of interest do not vary 
between national and European Parliament elections. Generally, there is evidence that the factors 
associated with the representation of women in national legislatures also hold at second-order elections 
(Vengroff et al. 2003). More recent work, however, suggests that electoral systems cannot explain the 
gap in women’s representation between national and European levels (Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 
2014). The latter findings suggests that our approach in focusing on individual level candidate viability 
rather than country level electoral rules alone may yield better explanations about media coverage.  
Allowing for a comprehensive examination of the coverage of candidates, both newspapers and 
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television news coverage were coded in each country. With at least two television news outlets (public 
and commercial) and at least three newspapers (two ‘quality’ and one tabloid) per country, the total 
sample consists of 58 television networks and 84 different newspapers.1 The time period covered is 
the three weeks prior to the election capturing the most intense period of campaigning for the 
elections. With regard to story selection, for television, all news items have been coded. For 
newspapers, due to the number of stories in a daily newspaper, a smaller sample was drawn. All news 
items on the front page and all news items on one randomly selected page were coded. In addition, in 
order to capture all news about the elections, all stories pertaining particularly to the EU and/or the EU 
election on any other page of the newspaper have been coded (within Political/News, 
Editorial/Opinion/Comment, and Business/Economy sections) (Schuck et al. 2010). Because we 
measure the visibility of candidates in the news, our analysis is based on a subset of stories that 
mention the EP elections. Given the breadth of outlets and the 3 week campaign period selected, our 
sample of stories includes most campaign-related news stories in major news outlets in each member 
state. As such it should be a fairly representative picture of news media coverage in general. From this 
database of news stories, we code the mentions of MEP candidates (visibility) and how positively or 
negatively each actor was covered in the news. The tone of coverage of candidates is measured by 
asking raters how “favourably or unfavourably is the MEP (actor) evaluated (regardless of the source) 
from his/her own perspective (i.e. from the perspective of the candidate)?” The coders are trained that 
this evaluation must be explicit and should be expressed in terms that are clearly positive or negative 
judgements (e.g., ”good”,  ”promising”,  ”ominous”,  ”disappointing”). Responses range from 
negative to positive on a 5 point scale with a mixed or balanced evaluation being the midpoint. Where 
evaluations are not explicit, coding of tone is not made.2 We have information on the tone of coverage 
                                                 
1 We note that there are differences across media systems, types of outlets and types of newspapers that we do not capture 
in our analysis for this paper. These variations may contribute to the overall space devoted to European elections, candidate 
focused coverage and tone. However, we do standardise our measure of the amount of coverage by country in order to deal 
with the potential differences introduced by media system differences. 
2 Reliability tests on coding of tone toward actors were conducted with multiple raters. The reliability score for the tone 
toward the main actors is .80.  
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only for 270 cases: these are candidates who were assigned an actor code and who actually received 
some media coverage.  
 
Candidate level model 
Unlike other cross-national studies on media coverage of women candidates, we propose a 
candidate based analysis rather than a country or party based analysis. This allows us to account for 
important candidate characteristics such as incumbency as well as party and country level 
characteristics that could affect visibility. In order to build the candidate-based data set, we undertake 
two transformations. First, we transpose the unit of analysis from the news story to the candidate. The 
unit of analysis in the media content analysis was originally the story and within each story the most 
prominent six actors were coded along with their gender, whether or not the actor was quoted and the 
evaluation (if any) of the candidate. This story-based data set is transformed into a data set where the 
candidate becomes the unit of analysis. To achieve a candidate based data set, the story-based media 
data were transposed by transforming candidates (actors) from variables to cases. In this way, it is 
possible to calculate how many times each candidate was mentioned (the amount of coverage she 
gained), and run candidate-level models. Since the number of news stories covering MEP candidates 
varies from one country to another, we generated a standardized measure of candidate coverage by 
calculating the proportion of times a candidate was mentioned against the total number of times MEP 
candidates were mentioned in the news media in a given country (share of media coverage), and use 
this as the main dependent variable. As a result, the values of the standardized candidate coverage vary 
from ‘0’ to ‘100’, indicating the percentage of total MEP coverage on a specific candidate in a given 
country. We also construct an indicator for the tone of coverage for each candidate taking the average 
tone across the stories that made an evaluation of the candidate. 
Second, due to censored sample of candidates in the media content (i.e. we do not code the 
entire pool of over 7000 MEP candidates), we build a database of all candidates for the EP election in 
order to examine selection effects. In the media coding, a list of the top 25 percentage of MEP 
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candidates was constructed and these individual candidates were coded within the stories and while 
this represented a substantial proportion of candidates in stories there were still some candidates who 
appeared in news stories but were not named on the list. Likewise, there are candidates not on the 
coding list who also did not garner any media attention. Therefore, our sample of candidates is 
censored because it does not include a large proportion of candidates who never received any 
coverage. We adjust for this by building a database with all MEP candidates (excluding parties and 
candidates who were not expected to exceed a minimum threshold of 2 percent of votes), including 
each candidate’s sex, incumbency, party, party list standing, and institutional and contextual variables. 
To these data, candidates’ individual media coverage from the media content data was linked. 
However, because not all candidates who received media coverage have a personal actor code means 
that only media coverage of candidates who have their personal actor code can be linked to the 
individual level dataset. Therefore, candidates whose media coverage is not coded to an individual 
actor but as “other X party MEP candidate” results in missing values in the candidate level dataset.  
Therefore, whether or not a candidate has a value for the media coverage variable and whether 
such coverage was individually measured in the media content study depends on a non-random event 
of being assigned a personal actor code. However, it is important to keep in mind that the censored 
sample in the media data set is not only due to coding procedures. In fact, prior to the non-random 
selection in the media study, there was another event of non-random selection – how political parties 
rank-ordered their female and male candidates in the lists. This initial rank-ordering determined which 
candidates were considered by the media study team as relevant candidates and thus assigned a 
personal actor code. 
The two processes described above (selection of relevant candidates by the media study and 
placement of candidates on a party list) lead to a censored sample and it then becomes important to 
establish the variables that explain selection into the sample of actors whose media coverage was 
captured in the 2009 media study before proceeding with individual level analysis. Supplementary 
analysis demonstrates that women are less likely than men to have been assigned a personal actor 
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code. However, when controlling for other possible selection variables the effect of gender becomes 
insignificant indicating that, once controlling for these other factors, there is no apparent bias in 
assigning actor codes to female candidates. Rather it suggests that (i) women candidates may be placed 
less frequently in the most viable list positions (list leaders); (ii) women are less likely to be 
incumbents than men, and / or (iii) women run for less viable parties. As a result, the sample selection 
is explained by candidate’s viability (list leader), incumbency, and her party’s viability. However, due 
to other possible types of selection bias, we employ the Heckman selection procedure (Heckman 1979) 
when estimating our models. 
A Heckman selection model estimates the probability of having a censored value on dependent 
variable by using probit analysis for the full sample. It is important to note that the probit function is 
estimated on the entire sample of observations (all MEP candidates) whereas the regression analysis is 
performed solely on the subsample of observations (MEP candidates whose media coverage was 
measured in the Media Study). Therefore, the relationship of interest is a simple linear model: 
Yi = x′i β + u   outcome equation 
However, due to the censored sample, Y is only observed if a second, unobserved latent variable 
exceeds a certain threshold: 
z*i = wi′α + ei; where zi = 1 if z*i > 0, and zi = 0, if otherwise. 
And therefore a probit selection function is used: 
Pr(zi = 1) = Φ(α′wi)  selection equation. 
In other words, the modeling explained above uses the information on candidates without actor 
codes, too, when predicting the amount of news media coverage individual candidates receive. 
Because the data are hierarchical, utilising individual, party, and country level variables, we report 
robust standard errors adjusted for the clusters of countries.3 
 
                                                 
3 A different modelling approach would be to use a multi-level model with three levels: individual candidate, party and 
country. However, estimation for a multi-level selection model becomes more complex and our interest is not in modelling 
variation across levels so we have opted to simply correct the standard errors for clustering. 
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Operationalization of Independent Variables 
For our analysis there are two types of independent variables: selection variables (use in the selection 
model) and predictors of the outcomes of interest – media coverage. The selection variables explain 
selection into the media sample and are, therefore, related to the viability of the candidate (or 
placement on a list). The selection factors include candidate viability (list leader or not), incumbency, 
and the electoral viability of the national party, for which the candidate is running. For candidate 
viability and incumbency we employ dichotomous variables. The electoral standing of the national 
party is operationalized by the share of votes the party received in the past national elections prior to 
the 2009 EP election and a dichotomous variable is used in the analysis (1 = party received more than 
10% of the vote, 0 = party received less than 10% of the vote).A candidate’s standardized list position 
is used to measure party list ranking. 
In addition to the above selection variables, we include factors set out in the theoretical section 
which are hypothesized to influence the level of media coverage received by candidates. We 
distinguish three types of voting systems – open list preferential, ordered list preferential, and closed 
list non-preferential voting system, closed list system being the baseline category.4 We operationalize 
candidate gender quotas by constructing two dichotomous variables: gender quotas without placement 
mandates and gender quotas with placement mandates. Countries without gender quotas are the 
baseline category (see Appendix 1 for operationalization). For measuring overall gender equality in 
society, we use the original gender equality index explained in Appendix 1. The models also include a 
control variable for the size of constituency (1 = single constituency, 0 = multiple constituencies). 
 
 
                                                 
4 Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, and Poland are coded as open list systems; Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden 
are coded as ordered list systems; and Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom (excl. the Northern Ireland constituency) are coded as 
closed list voting systems (Farrell and Scully 2005; Giebler 2012; Kotnarowski 2012).   
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Results 
Before reporting the results of the candidate-based model, we first examine to the extent to which any 
bias exists in the coverage of female candidates at the country level. The left-hand graph on Figure 1 
shows the relationship between the share of female candidates in each member state and the visibility 
of female candidates in the news during the 2009 European Parliament election campaign. The dashed 
diagonal line represents a situation where the proportion of media coverage women candidates receive 
is equal to their share among all candidates. In the majority of countries female candidates gain 
proportionally much less media attention than we would expect given their share among candidates if 
there was no gender gap in news coverage. Moreover, the fitted line depicts a slight negative 
relationship between the proportion of women candidates and the coverage they receive in the news.  
The most extreme examples of gender bias in news attention are Spain and Austria where 
women constitute around 40 percent among all candidates but receive only around 5 percent of the 
media coverage. On the contrary, women candidates in Hungary, Ireland, Romania, and Sweden enjoy 
more media coverage than their share among candidates would predict. Ireland and Romania both had 
one very prominent and controversial female candidate who received the majority of the media 
attention among women. For both Romania and Hungary, the representation of women at the European 
level far exceeds that at the national level (Chiva 2012) which may be linked to a greater amount of 
coverage for these ‘novel’ candidates. In Sweden, which has only slightly more media coverage for 
women than would be expected, the pattern is consistent over time because Sweden was the most 
gender equal country in terms of news media coverage of candidates in previous studies on European 
Parliament elections (see Banducci et al. 2007). Austria, where there are voluntary party quotas of 50% 
women, and Spain with a 40% legislative gender quota, demonstrate that the quotas increase the share 
of women as candidates but that this does not translate into greater media coverage.  
The focus of this paper is to establish whether male and female candidates who are similar in 
terms of experience receive different media treatment. Therefore, in the right-hand graph in Figure 1 
we examine gender bias in media coverage amongst only those candidates who are list leaders. 
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Comparing the two figures suggests that party-determined viability, where the candidate appears in the 
list, does affect women’s news media coverage. Unlike the left-hand graph on Figure 1, the fitted line 
on the right-hand graph indicates a positive linear relationship between the proportion of women 
among list leaders and the proportion of media coverage they receive relative to male candidates. 
While not a perfect fit, the right hand figure suggests that when comparing like candidates the gap 
between men and women’s media coverage does narrow. Therefore, our initial examination of the data 
on women’s media coverage relative to their proportion of candidates suggests that parties and their 
selection processes do lead to less coverage as the news media focus on list leaders. In particular, in 
countries such as Spain and Austria, the bias is considerably reduced when controlling for list leaders. 
However, for a number of countries such as Belgium, France and the UK, there is still a substantial 
difference between the number of women list leaders and their visibility in the news coverage.  
(Figure 1 here) 
 
The initial look at the data in Figure 1 provides evidence of a gender gap in candidates news 
media coverage but also suggests that the gap in media coverage may not be as much about gender, as 
it is about whether women are selected as the most viable candidates. In other words, there is a party 
selection bias with more men being selected as list leaders rather than strictly a media bias. In order to 
establish if the gap in media coverage is in fact about the selection and placement of candidates within 
party selection offices, our analysis proceeds by testing the same hypothesis with multivariate 
candidate level analysis where we control for candidate, party and country level factors that may affect 
the level of media coverage received by candidates. 
 
Results of Candidate-Level Analyses  
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We first estimate models for all candidates (Table 1). Next we 
estimate the same effects in countries with open and ordered preferential lists where we can include an 
estimate of candidate viability or list position (Table 2). We then estimate a set of models with just list 
leaders in ordered and closed list systems (Table 3).We run this set of models (all candidates versus 
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those in preference voting systems) because we are primarily interested in how the effects of viable 
candidacy explain women candidates’ news media coverage.  Since there is no rank ordering of 
candidates by party gatekeepers in open list systems, it is necessary to omit the cases from open list 
systems to study how candidates’ party-determined viability affects their news media visibility. We 
also run separate models for male and female candidates and compare the differences of the 
coefficients with Chi Square tests5 because we expect different variances and effects for the two 
groups. Finally, we examine how the tone of coverage differs between male and female candidates 
(Tables 4 and 5). Given the small number of cases we compare means rather than use a multivariate 
model. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of candidates’ individual media coverage across 25 EU member 
states (all three voting systems). For the selection model, we see that whereas party viability is in this 
case an insignificant selection variable, candidate incumbency is a strong positive predictor of the 
likelihood of having been assigned an actor code.6 In terms of the second stage model, we 
hypothesised above that there is no gender bias in the news media coverage of the 2009 European 
Parliament elections once taking into account party selection factors. We cannot control for list 
position (viability) in the set of models in Table 1 because we include open list system where the party 
does not order candidates. We do control for all other factors and see that female candidate, on 
average, receive less news coverage than male candidates. Given our outcome variable is the 
percentage of coverage candidates received, our estimated coefficient indicates that women receive, on 
average, 1.3% less coverage than men. Given the low saliency of these second order elections in the 
news media, this small but statistically significant difference may yet still translate into greater name 
                                                 
5 We use the suest (seemingly unrelated estimation) command in Stata which combines the estimation 
results – parameter estimates and associated (co)variance matrices – stored under namelist into one 
parameter vector and simultaneous (co)variance matrix of the sandwich/robust type. Typical 
applications of suest are tests for intra-model or cross-model hypotheses. 
6 Due to the fact that incumbency is the only statistically significant selection variable in the models 
that do not include party-determined candidate viability variables, incumbency could not be included 
in the outcome equation. 
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recognition for some candidates.  
In this first set of models we have not controlled for viability so we could treat this as a 
baseline test of gender bias in news coverage and we see evidence of bias. Our second and third 
hypotheses test for differential impact of voting systems on female candidates. We hypothesized that 
women would have greater visibility in preferential than closed systems and less coverage in ordered 
list systems. Women, contrary to expectations, receive less coverage in preferential systems when 
compared to closed systems. Preferential open lists systems have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on women’s coverage. Female candidates receive, on average, 2.5% less news coverage in open 
list systems when compared to closed systems. As hypothesized there is a negative effect of ordered 
lists when compared to closed lists but this is not statistically significant (H3). On the other hand, men 
receive 2.5% more coverage in ordered list systems compared to closed systems. This net advantage 
for male candidates across preferential systems is investigated further with the results in Table 2. 
Overall, contrary to expectations, closed list systems have a positive effect on women’s visibility in 
election news suggesting that women are less disadvantaged in terms of media coverage when voters 
cast a vote for an entire party rather than for a candidate in a preferential system. 
In terms of our other explanatory variables, from the first model in Table 1 we see that 
candidates receive more news media coverage in countries with a single constituency and that this is 
the case for both men and women. This advantage may be a result of the focus on national media. In 
countries where there is only one constituency, it is likely that campaign takes place at the national 
level and thus the national media cover it more. In essence, there are fewer candidates to focus on with 
only one list. It is also less costly for the media to decide whom to cover from a smaller set of possible 
candidates. Overall gender equality appears to have a differential effect on women and men 
candidates’ news media coverage, indicated by the opposite sign of the coefficient. Where there is 
greater gender equality, controlling for other relevant factors, women candidates gain greater media 
attention. At the same time, quota legislation appears to have no effect on women candidates’ news 
media coverage. Indeed, simple quotas without a placement mandate reduces coverage for women 
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candidates by, on average, 2.7%. The result is marginally significant and does suggest that while 
quotas are necessary to increase the number of female candidates, this does not always directly lead to 
similar levels of media coverage.  
(Table 1 here) 
Results in Table 2 explain more in detail the differences between ordered list preference voting 
and closed list non-preference voting systems. These models also include measures of candidates’ 
party-determined viability, which allow us to better evaluate how the variables affecting women’s 
chances for viable candidacy are likely to affect the amount of news media coverage they receive.  
All selection variables in Table 2 show expected results. List leaders, incumbents, and candidates 
running for a viable party are more likely to have an actor code and thus individually measured media 
coverage. Our first hypothesis was that candidate viability determined the amount of coverage received 
by a candidate and that gender differences would be non-existent once we took this into account. In 
other words, we expected that the significant gender effect in Table 1 who disappear or weaken when 
candidate viability is taken into account. Contrary to our hypothesis, viability is not positively related 
to news media coverage. Furthermore, when we are able to control for list position, women still 
receive significantly less news media coverage than men and the effect size is similar to that for all 
electoral systems. On average, women receive 1.4% less coverage than men.  
As in Table 1 and contrary to our second and third hypotheses, women receive significantly 
less news media coverage in ordered list preferential voting systems than in open list voting systems; 
whereas, the opposite holds for men. Our expectation was that where candidates had an incentive to 
personalise the campaign, news coverage would be drawn to more novel female candidates. However, 
where there are greater incentives for personalised campaigns it appears the news media focus on male 
candidates. This result may be due to greater campaign efforts by male candidates in preferential 
systems or because news media tend to focus on male candidates. Our fourth hypothesis was that 
viability would have a greater impact on women’s coverage than men’s. We do see that as women’s 
position moves further down the list media coverage does diminish. This is a statistically significant 
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effect for women. There is no similar negative and significant effect for men. The Chi2 test for 
differences between coefficients indicates that the difference between the coefficients for men and 
women is statistically significant (difference in Chi2 = 2.66). Therefore, while viability does not 
adversely influence the news coverage of men it does reduce the coverage of women – as a female 
candidate moves down the list by a unit on our standardised scale coverage diminishes by 3.5%. 
At this point it is important to consider the incentives the media have in covering female 
candidates differently in different voting systems. The one variable not included in the analysis is 
media “effort” on the part of the candidate. We do not control for how hard candidates in different 
voting systems campaign in order to receive news media coverage. Since party gatekeepers appear to 
treat female candidates differently in ordered list voting systems compared to closed list voting 
systems in regards to their party-determined viability (see Luhiste 2015), it is possible that female 
candidates’ campaign strategies vary across voting systems. When women are granted less viable 
candidacies in ordered list systems compared to closed list systems, they may also be less likely to put 
in the extra effort in their campaign to attract more media coverage. Contrary, women in closed list 
systems, when ranked high on electoral lists, would probably receive media coverage regardless of 
their personal campaign as the media coverage in closed list systems is more likely to be party- and 
prominent candidate centred. Hence, alternative interpretation of the results of this paper would be that 
party gatekeepers’ dismal support for women candidates in ordered list systems does not directly but 
indirectly explain women’s dearth of media coverage in these systems.    
(Table 2 here) 
 
Results in Table 3 indicate that even if the sample includes election list leaders only, women 
nevertheless receive less news media coverage than men. When the sample is restricted to just list 
leaders, we find that women on average receive 1.7% less of the coverage than male candidates. These 
results give us further evidence that when comparing like candidates, women candidates still receive 
significantly less coverage. The effects of the type of voting system and overall gender equality show 
the same direction as in full models, the coefficients for both “Female list leaders” and “Male list 
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leaders” model have lost the traditional level of statistical significance. This could be due to the small 
sample sizes. However, the estimates in question of the “Female list leaders” model differ in 
statistically significant way from the estimates of the “Male list leaders” model, suggesting that female 
list leaders have higher chances for news media coverage in closed list systems and in countries with 
high level of gender equality, again similar to the models with all candidates. 
(Table 3 about here) 
We next turn to the tone of coverage and our fifth hypothesis. Table 4 shows that 80% of the 
times when MEP candidates were covered, they were not explicitly evaluated. Yet, women candidates 
were more likely evaluated than men: one quarter of the coverage that female MEP candidates 
received was explicitly evaluated, compared to less than one fifth of male candidates’ coverage. 
Moreover, the toned coverage of women was equally divided between negative (11% of total 
coverage) and positive evaluation (12% of total coverage) while men were more frequently negatively 
(13% of total coverage) than positively (5% of total coverage) evaluated. Given the high proportion of 
highly viable candidates (election list leaders) in the full sample, it is unsurprising that there are no 
differences in the tone of coverage of all candidates and that of election list leaders. However, 
incumbency appears to influence how candidates are covered in the news media, with incumbents 
receiving less toned news media coverage than non-incumbents. Only one in five occasions when an 
incumbent women candidate was covered in the news, was she evaluated. In comparison, incumbent 
men candidates were evaluated only one in ten times they were portrayed in the news. Similarly to 
non-incumbent women, female incumbents who were evaluated were as likely to be evaluated 
negatively or positively (9% of total coverage in both cases). Contrarily, non-incumbent men were 
more likely negatively evaluated than incumbent men. This indicates that incumbency is more likely to 
increase men’s chances for non-negative news media coverage than women’s.  
(Table 4 here) 
 
As the data presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 suggest that women are likely to receive less news 
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media coverage in preferential voting systems than in countries utilising closed list electoral systems, 
we also examine how the tone of coverage female candidates received varies by voting systems. Table 
5 shows that women received considerably more toned coverage in ordered list preferential voting 
systems (44% of total coverage) than in open list preferential (14% of total coverage) and in closed list 
non-preferential voting systems (25% of total coverage). In closed list systems women were more 
likely evaluated negatively (13% of total coverage) than positively (10% of total coverage). On the 
other hand, in both types of preferential systems, women were more often evaluated positively than 
negatively, especially so in ordered list systems. Male candidates, too, are more likely to have received 
toned coverage in ordered list systems (31% of total coverage) than in closed and open list systems 
(15% and 13% of total coverage respectively). However, unlike for women, the type of voting system 
has little impact on how negatively or positively male candidates are portrayed because men received 
considerably more negative than positive news media coverage in all voting systems.  
(Table 5 here) 
 
Conclusion 
Many scholars report that women candidates receive smaller amounts of news media coverage than 
male candidates (Banducci et al. 2007; Kahn 2003; Kahn and Goldenberg 1991). However, more 
recent studies have failed to find empirical evidence that the amount of media coverage that male and 
female candidates obtain varies significantly (Heldman et al. 2009; Smith 1997; Uscinski and Goren 
2011). While the current literature offers interesting and consistent examples of how the media treat 
female and male candidates differently in terms of the tone and type of coverage, we have limited 
knowledge of why some studies find and others fail to find differential media treatment of men and 
women. In this paper, we hypothesized that women’s news media coverage during electoral campaigns 
is not an independent process, but influenced by the behavior of different actors, i.e. parties, 
candidates, voters, and by the electoral rules and overall context. Therefore, we hypothesized that the 
gender bias in candidate coverage depends on specific electoral rules, such as the type of voting 
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systems, and on party gatekeepers’ decisions when ranking candidates in electoral lists. However, once 
controlling for these factors we find that there is still a persistent, albeit small, gender gap in the 
amount of coverage. Importantly, we find that when controlling for viability the gender gap in 
coverage does not disappear. Political parties may be responsible for not promoting women candidates 
in list systems of candidates but when comparing men and women in similar positions or even as party 
leaders a bias in the coverage remains. Therefore, despite party factors explaining some of the gender 
differences in coverage, at least part of the gender bias in candidate coverage appears to be the media’s 
own creation. 
The differential coverage for male and female candidates may send cues to voters, at least 
partly due to their non-viable position, that women are not a ‘normal’ part of political world. 
Furthermore, by covering female candidates less often than male candidates, the media encourage 
party elites’ gender biased decisions when nominating and soliciting candidates in future elections, 
too. Such assumption is further supported by the finding that women receive even less news media 
coverage compared to men in preferential voting systems, where candidate’s list position is less crucial 
for her viability, than in countries with closed and blocked party list voting. Thus, under conditions 
where the competition for individual media coverage is less dependent on parties and likely to be 
fiercer, media give advantage to male candidates. However, while women may electorally suffer from 
limited news media coverage in ordered list preferential voting systems, the fact that they receive more 
positive evaluation in those systems, compared to open and closed list systems and compared to men, 
may somewhat limit the probable electoral penalty they would have to pay otherwise.  
We do find that where the gender equality index points to more gender equal societies, women 
candidates are more likely to be represented in the election news coverage. We suggest that where 
there is greater equality, the media may find it easier to reflect this equality because (i) there are more 
women to cover, (ii) there are more women in key positions deciding who gets more media coverage, 
and (iii) the newsroom perceive more demand from the wider public to cover women more in the 
media, too. Thus, for female candidates the contextual political environment can either stimulate or 
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depress their chances for news media coverage. While women candidates do not benefit from 
preferential voting, overall gender equality in the society increases their likelihood for receiving more 
news media coverage during campaigning.  
Our results indicating there is less media coverage of women where there are quotas without 
mandated placement points to several possible confounding factors in preventing women’s electoral 
success. Quotas are intended to increase women’s electoral representation by ensuring that important 
first step of increasing the share of women amongst candidates. However, we see that becoming a 
candidate does not equal media coverage. Our analysis suggests that further work is necessary on 
understanding the conditions under which quotas are adopted. If quotas are adopted in less progressive 
countries, the gendered media culture may not reflect the political push to increase women’s 
representation and therefore lag behind in terms of representing women in its coverage. Overall, 
therefore, our results point to both a party and a media logic where the gender gap in coverage is 
considered. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Gender Differences in Media Coverage: 2009 EP Elections 
 
Source: 2009 European Election Media Study 
Note: Figures display the proportion of elections news media coverage allocated to female candidates plotted 
against the proportion of female candidates in each country. The dotted diagonal line represents the expected 
relationship if no bias in coverage. The solid line represents the line of best fit when regressing the share of 
coverage on the proportion of candidates. 
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Table 1: Explaining candidates' individual news media coverage 
  All candidates Female candidates Male candidates Difference: Chi2 
Outcome: Std. News Media Coverage        
Female candidate -1.26 (0.62) *       
Preferential voting: open list 0.30 (0.70)  -2.49 (1.09) * 1.16 (0.99)  4.26 * 
Preferential voting: ordered list 1.49 (1.27)  -1.61 (1.61)  2.55 (1.47) + 4.24 * 
Gender equality -0.30 (6.38)  8.98 (8.20)  -3.36 (7.52)  1.73  
Simple quotas -0.20 (1.23)  -2.25 (1.31) + 0.29 (1.36)  3.11 + 
Quotas with placement mandates 2.47 (2.26)  -1.83 (1.65)  4.37 (2.98)  3.36 + 
One constituency 7.17 (1.07) ** 6.00 (1.19) ** 7.18 (1.27) ** 0.70  
Constant 4.22 (3.60)   -1.84 (4.57)   5.81 (4.44)       
Selection: Actor code         
Incumbency 1.19 (0.18) ** 1.15 (0.21) ** 1.21 (0.19) ** 0.12  
Viable party -0.09 (0.06)  -0.08 (0.09)  -0.09 (0.06)  0.00  
Constant -1.60 (0.07) ** -1.81 (0.08) ** -1.51 (0.07) **   
                  
Rho -0.21 (0.09)  -0.03 (0.23)  -0.26 (0.10)    
rho(=0): chi2(1) 5.65 * 0.03  6.20 *   
Wald Chi2 (df=6) 86.79  53.80  69.65   
N 7661  2724  4911    
Level 2 N 25  25  25    
Censored observations 7133  2600  4507    
Uncensored observations 528   124   404       
**p < 0.01; *p<0.05; =p<0.10; robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
Source: 2009 EP candidate lists; 2009 EES Media Content Study 
a Chi2 statistic indicates the difference between the estimates of the female candidates and the male 
candidates models. 
  
  
34 
Table 2: Explaining Candidate Visibility in Preferential List Systems  
     
  All candidates Female candidates Male candidates Difference: Chi2 
Outcome: Std. News Media Coverage        
Female candidate -1.41 (0.77) +       
Viability: std. list position -0.79 (1.02)  -3.57 (1.41) * -0.34 (1.00)  2.66 + 
Incumbency 1.61 (1.51)  0.90 (1.72)  2.24 (1.42)  0.35  
Preferential voting: ordered list 2.00 (1.34)  -3.38 (1.40) * 3.75 (1.54) * 13.97 ** 
Gender equality -3.11 (9.45)  15.52 (8.39) + -11.63 (11.11)  7.95 ** 
Simple quotas -0.12 (1.89)  -2.70 (1.52) + 0.89 (2.13)  3.85 * 
Quotas with placement mandates 5.08 (2.98) + 0.45 (1.55)  8.01 (3.76) * 4.35 * 
One constituency 6.71 (1.52) ** 7.56 (1.31) ** 5.85 (1.70) ** 1.38  
Constant 1.20 (5.67)   -12.66 (4.73) ** 5.63 (6.71)       
Selection: Actor code         
Viability: list leader 2.52 (0.19) ** 2.88 (0.21) ** 2.37 (0.19) ** 12.14 ** 
Incumbency 0.54 (0.15) ** 0.53 (0.17) ** 0.54 (0.15) ** 0.01  
Viable party 0.45 (0.09) ** 0.48 (0.16) ** 0.44 (0.08) ** 0.07  
Constant -2.58 (0.15) ** -2.84 (0.12) ** -2.45 (0.17) **     
Rho 0.06 (0.17)  0.59 (0.28)  0.00 (0.18)    
rho(=0): chi2(1) 0.15  2.50 + 0.00    
Wald Chi2  70.25 (df=8) 356.08 (df=7) 64.88 (df=7)  
N 5413  2089  3299    
Level 2 N 20  20  20    
Censored observations 5085  2007  3053    
Uncensored observations 328   82   246       
 **p < 0.01; *p<0.05; =p<0.10; robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
Source: 2009 EP candidate lists; 2009 EES Media Content Study 
a Chi2 statistic indicates the difference between the estimates of the female candidates and the male 
candidates models. 
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Table 3: Explaining list leaders' news media coverage in ordered and closed list systems 
  All list leaders Female list leaders Male list leaders Difference: Chi2 
Outcome: Std. News Media Coverage        
Female candidate -1.72 (0.79) *       
Preferential voting: ordered list 0.97 (1.66)  -3.38 (2.44)  2.57 (1.89)  4.52 * 
Gender equality 0.35 (10.33)  14.46 (10.67)  -8.12 (12.76)  3.51 + 
Simple quotas -0.58 (2.12)  -3.77 (2.02) + 0.70 (2.40)  4.05 * 
Quotas with placement mandates 5.08 (2.88) + -0.95 (1.32)  8.25 (3.74) * 5.81 * 
One constituency 7.35 (1.93) ** 7.92 (2.24) ** 6.53 (2.05) ** 0.55  
Constant 2.82 (5.45)   -4.69 (5.88)   6.10 (6.66)       
Selection: Actor code         
Incumbency 0.81 (0.14) ** 1.21 (0.41) ** 0.72 (0.19) ** 0.86  
Viable party 0.97 (0.21) ** 1.22 (0.34) ** 0.92 (0.23) ** 0.57  
Constant -0.13 (0.18)  -0.19 (0.17)  -0.12 (0.20)    
                  
Rho -0.15 (0.10)  -0.08 (0.22)  -0.18 (0.11)    
rho(=0): chi2(1) 2.13  0.13  2.24    
Wald Chi2 (df=5) 57.68  52.36  52.77    
N 457  115  342    
Level 2 N 20  19  20    
Censored observations 179  43  136    
Uncensored observations 278   72   206       
**p < 0.01; *p<0.05; =p<0.10; robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
Source: 2009 EP candidate lists; 2009 EES Media Content Study 
a Chi2 statistic indicates the difference between the estimates of the female candidates and the male 
candidates models. 
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Table 4: Tone of Media Coverage by Candidate Gender, viability and incumbency 
  All candidates List leaders Incumbent candidates 
  
Women Men All candidates Women Men All candidates Women Men All candidates 
No toned coverage 75% 82% 81% 73% 83% 82% 81% 90% 89% 
Neutral coverage 3% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Positive coverage 12% 5% 5% 12% 4% 5% 9% 4% 4% 
Negative coverage 11% 13% 12% 12% 12% 12% 9% 6% 6% 
N (times mentioned) 405 3761 4166 332 3295 3627 159 1649 1808 
N (candidates) 61 209 270 45 160 205 21 73 94 
Source: 2009 EES Media Content Study 
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Table 5: Tone of news media coverage by candidate gender and voting system 
  Female candidates Male candidates 
  
Open lists 
Ordered 
lists 
Closed 
lists 
Open lists 
Ordered 
lists 
Closed 
lists 
No toned coverage 86% 66% 75% 87% 69% 85% 
Neutral coverage 2% 4% 2% 1% 1% 0% 
Positive coverage 7% 19% 10% 4% 11% 3% 
Negative coverage 5% 11% 13% 8% 18% 12% 
N (times mentioned) 97 133 175 592 754 2415 
N (candidates) 19 22 20 66 66 77 
Source: 2009 EES Media Content Study   
  
1 
APPENDIX 1: Measurement of variables 
 
Measurement of overall levels of gender equality:  
 
We use the following eight indicators to measure the different dimensions of gender equality: 
 Equal share of employment: (1) gender gap in employment; (2) gender gap in unemployment. 
 Equal share of money: (3) gender pay gap; (4) gender gap in risk of poverty after social 
transfer. 
 Equal share of power: (5) gender gap in national parliament (lower chamber); (6) gender gap in 
ISCO 1 level occupations. 
 Equal share of time: (7) gender gap in hours spent educating children and caring for them 
among people in full-time employment; (8) gender gap in hours spent cooking and doing house 
chores among people in full-time employment. 
Since the indicators are measured on different scales, the actual values of the indicators are 
standardized using the min-max methodology in order to calculate the composite index.  
 
The formula is:  
Standardized value =
|actual value x1|−min value x1 
max value x1−min value x1
, 
 
where the actual value is a national score on the indicator (i.e., gender gap of 5% in 
unemployment); where a situation of absolute equality (no gender gap) refers to the maximum value 
and has assigned the value 0; and where the minimum value is set at a level which is a little below the 
actual minimum value within the sample of EU countries. Since gender equality is understood as the 
absence of gender gaps, both positive and negative gaps are treated the same way which means that the 
absolute value of the gender gap is used. As a result, the standardized values of each indicator vary 
between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to a situation of the worst inequality in the EU, and 1 
corresponds to a situation of absolute equality. The composite index is calculated by summing up the 
standardized values of all indicators and dividing the sum by the number of indicators. Table A 
summarizes the scores of overall gender equality across EU member states. 
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Table A: Overall ranking of 25 EU member states on gender equality index (2007-2009) 
Country 
Employme
nt 
Unem
ploym
ent 
Pay 
Risk of 
povert
y 
Political 
power 
Socio-
econo
mic 
power 
Care 
activities 
Househ
old 
activities 
Comp
osite 
index 
score 
Sweden 0.88 0.91 0.42 0.98 0.93 0.49 0.74 0.58 0.74 
Finland 0.95 0.81 0.35 0.69 0.8 0.41 0.93 0.67 0.7 
Denmark 0.85 0.84 0.43 0.87 0.72 0.25 0.85 0.67 0.68 
Belgium 0.67 0.96 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.51 0.7 0.33 0.66 
France 0.75 0.91 0.45 0.89 0.25 0.67 0.56 0.5 0.62 
Poland 0.61 0.87 0.76 0.91 0.3 0.61 0.48 0.42 0.62 
Bulgaria 0.75 0.94 0.6 0.62 0.33 0.49 0.74 0.42 0.61 
Hungary 0.67 0.91 0.47 1 0.08 0.61 0.78 0.33 0.61 
Romania 0.61 0.73 0.59 0.82 0.09 0.41 0.78 0.83 0.61 
Slovenia 0.79 0.99 0.73 0.47 0.14 0.58 0.74 0.42 0.61 
Portugal 0.72 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.49 0.46 0.74 0.17 0.6 
Luxembourg 0.52 0.8 0.6 0.78 0.37 n.d. 0.56 0.42 0.58 
Spain 0.59 0.9 0.45 0.56 0.68 0.49 0.56 0.25 0.56 
Latvia 0.99 0.08 0.5 0.38 0.29 0.75 0.78 0.58 0.55 
Germany 0.72 0.84 0.26 0.6 0.58 0.65 0.41 0.25 0.54 
Netherlands 0.68 0.99 0.24 0.8 0.8 0.36 0.04 0.42 0.54 
Italy 0.35 0.64 0.84 0.47 0.32 0.52 0.81 0.17 0.52 
Slovakia 0.56 0.8 0.24 0.75 0.28 0.42 0.59 0.33 0.5 
UK 0.71 0.69 0.32 0.58 0.28 0.56 0.41 0.42 0.5 
Austria 0.69 0.94 0.18 0.51 0.47 0.38 0.33 0.17 0.46 
Lithuania 0.96 0.04 0.35 0.18 0.24 0.72 0.59 0.5 0.45 
Czech Rep. 0.5 0.74 0.24 0.67 0.19 0.37 0.33 0.42 0.43 
Estonia 0.97 0.1 0 0.09 0.31 0.61 0.22 0.67 0.37 
Cyprus 0.56 0.96 0.25 0.29 0.16 0.03 0.63 0.08 0.37 
Greece 0.28 0.1 0.31 0.76 0.17 0.38 0.59 0.08 0.33 
 
Sources: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2009; Eurostat 
2009; Eurostat 2007a; Eurostat 2007b; International Labor Organisation 2008; Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 2008. 
 
Simple quotas: legislative and voluntary party quotas which do not specify a placement 
mandate rule. 
Quotas with placement mandate rule: legislative and voluntary party quotas which specify the 
list placement of women in electoral lists. 
The right-hand “Placement mandate” columns in Tables G and J specify the placement mandate rule. 
Candidates running for parties or in countries without placement mandate rule were coded 0 and 
candidates running for parties or in countries with placement mandate rule were coded 1. Tables B and 
C summarize the use of legislative and voluntary party quotas.  
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Table B: Legislative candidate quota rules for the election of MEPsa 
Country Legislative quota Placement mandate rule 
Belgium 50% of each gender.  
Weak: the two top candidates on candidate lists cannot 
be of the same gender. 
France 50% of each gender.  
Strong: strict alternation between men and women 
throughout the list. 
Poland Minimum of 35% of each gender. None. 
Portugal Minimum of 33% of each gender.  
Moderate: the lists cannot have more than two 
consecutive names of the same sex. 
Slovenia Minimum of 40% of each gender.  Weak: at least one candidate of each sex figures in the 
first half of any list. 
Spain Minimum of 40% of each gender.  
Moderate: quotas are not only applied to the whole 
party lists but also every five posts.  
Source: Quota Project 2010. 
a EU member states missing from the Table employ no legislative candidate gender quotas. 
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Table C: Voluntary party quota rules for the election of MEPs 
Countrya Party Voluntary party quota Placement mandate rule 
Austria The Greens-Green Alternative (GA) 50% of each gender  
Austria Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) Minimum of 33% of each gender  
Austria 
Social Democratic Party of Austria 
(SPÖ) Minimum of 40% of each gender  
Cyprus 
Movement of Social Democrats 
(KISOS) 
Minimum of 30% of each gender  
Czech Rep. Social Democrats (ČSSD) Minimum of 25% of each gender 
Moderate: 25 percent women among 
party's top candidates 
France Socialist Party (PS) 50% of each gender  
Germany 
Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD) 
Minimum of 40% of each gender.  
Strong: lists should be zipped, with 
the option of allocating every fifth 
place to someone of either sex  
Germany The Left Party 50% of each gender 
Strong: the first two and then every 
other place are reserved for women 
Germany Alliance 90/The Greens 50% of each gender  
Germany Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Minimum of 33% of each gender  
Greece 
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) 
Minimum of 40% of each gender  
Hungary Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) Minimum of 20% of each gender  
Hungary Politics Can Be Different (LMP) Minimum of 33% of each gender 
Moderate: the lists cannot have more 
than two consecutive names of the 
same sex 
Italy Democratic Party (PD) 50% of each gender 
Strong: alternation between men and 
women throughout the list 
Lithuania Social Democratic Party (LSDP) Minimum of 33% of each gender  
Luxembourg 
Christian Social People's Party 
(CSV) 
Minimum of 33% of each gender 
(target) 
 
Luxembourg The Left   50% of each gender  
Luxembourg The Green Party 50% of each gender (target)  
Netherlands Labour Party (PvdA) 50% of each gender 
Strong: alternation between men and 
women throughout the list 
Netherlands Green Left (GL) Percentage not confirmed  
Romania Democratic Party (PD) Minimum of 30% of each gender  
Romania Social Democratic Party (PSD) Minimum of 30% of each gender  
Slovakia 
People's Party - Movement for 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 
50% of each gender (target)  
Sweden Social Democratic Party (S) 50% of each gender 
Strong: alternation between men and 
women throughout the list 
Sweden Left Party (V) 50% of each gender  
Sweden Green Party (MP) 
50% of each gender, plus minus one 
person 
 
Sweden Moderate Party (M) Percentage not confirmed 
Two women and two men shall be 
placed on the top four positions on 
the party list 
United Kingdomb Labour Party   50% of each gender 
Strong: alternation between men and 
women throughout the list 
Source: Quota Project 2010. 
a Countries in which voluntary party quota requirements do not exceed legislative quota requirements 
are excluded from this table. 
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Supplementary Analysis 
Testing for Sample Selection Bias 
 
 
In this supplementary analysis, we investigate any sample selection bias in the coding of media 
coverage of political candidates. Relevant candidates captured for the media content were selected on 
the basis of viability (list position) and list position is the result of party selection. Therefore, the risk is 
that viable male candidates are overrepresented in the sample. This overrepresentation of candidates 
who we would expect to receive greater coverage could potentially exaggerate our results. Therefore, 
we have estimated a model predicting selection into the sample of actors coded in the media study 
based on a full sample of MEP candidates. Results in Table D indicate that candidates with higher list 
ranking are more likely to have an individual actor code. However, the data also show that a model in 
which having an actor code is predicted with a dummy variable of viability (whether a candidate is a 
list leader or not) has more explanatory power. Table D also indicates that incumbent office holders 
and candidates running on a viable party’s list are more likely to have their individual actor code.  
While binary regression results suggest that women are less likely than men to have been assigned a 
personal actor code, when controlling for other possible selection variables the effect of gender 
becomes insignificant. This indicates that the Media Content Study team did not systematically avoid 
assigning actor codes to female candidates. Rather it suggests that (i) women candidates may be placed 
less frequently in the most viable list positions (list leaders); (ii) women are less likely to be 
incumbents than men, and / or (iii) women run for less viable parties. As a result, the sample selection 
is explained by candidate’s viability (list leader), incumbency, and her party’s viability. Our solution to 
this problem is to estimate a Heckman selection model. 
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Table D: Explaining the Election Bias in the 2009 Media Content Data  
 
**p < 0.01; *p<0.05; robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
Source: 2009 EP candidate lists; 2009 EES Media Content Data 
Note: The table above presents estimated coefficients from a logit model predicting whether MEP 
candidates were given an individual actor code in the media content analysis (selected into candidate 
sample).  
 
 
